The Turkish competition law regime merely allows for settlement for non-cartel conducts. To that end, given that the settlement mechanism in Turkey is a newly established system, there is room for observation and growth by means of enforcement practice and as a well-established system, US enforcement practices as well as procedures in terms of settlement cases may be of use for the nascent Turkish settlement mechanism.
The differences and convergences in terms of the following objectives/advantages of the settlement mechanism should be addressed between the nascent Turkish system on one hand, and well-established US system on the other:
- The settlement mechanism aims to remedy the harm stemming from the anti-competitive behaviour via immediate cessation of the conduct at issue. The immediate stoppage of the potential anti-competitive conduct may save resources of the antitrust agency as well as the undertakings under scrutiny and the consumers and release them from having to going through costly and uncertain proceedings.
- Additionally, a settlement allows for the undertaking under scrutiny and the antitrust agency to negotiate a remedy that would resolve the anti-competitive concerns at hand and thereby enables the undertakings to precisely detect the pro-competitive aspects of the conduct at hand. To that end, a settlement may have advantages for foreseeability and also allows for the industry to proceed with the potentially violating conduct sorting the anti-competitive dynamics out and leaving the pro-competitive ones in effect.
- Furthermore, settlement saves money and resources of both antitrust agencies and undertakings. Given that antitrust probes and litigations are resource-intensive processes, settlement mechanism allows for the antitrust agencies and companies to save great resources required for investigations and litigation.
